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Abstract
This paper stresses the special role of multinational headquarters in corporate
profit shifting strategies. Using a large panel of European firms, we show that
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are reluctant to shift profits away from their
headquarters even if these are located in high-tax countries. Thus, shifting ac-
tivities in response to corporate tax rate differentials between parents and sub-
sidiaries are found to be significantly larger if the parent observes a lower corpo-
rate tax rate than its subsidiary and profit is thus shifted towards the headquar-
ters firm. This result is in line with recent empirical evidence suggesting that
MNEs bias the location of profits and highly profitable assets in favor of the
headquarters location (for agency cost reasons among others).
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the public economics literature brought forward comprehensive empir-
ical evidence that multinational enterprises (MNEs) shift paper profits from high-tax
to low-tax economies in order to reduce their corporate tax burden. Common profit
shifting strategies comprise the tax-favorable distortion of intra-firm transfer prices
and the debt-equity-structure or the relocation of highly profitable assets like patents
or trademarks to low-tax affiliates (see e.g. Hines and Rice, 1994; Clausing, 2003; De-
vereux and Maffini, 2007; Buettner and Wamser, 2007; Dischinger and Riedel, 2010).
In consequence, high-tax economies suffer from considerable tax revenue losses. Using
information on a sample of European multinationals in 1999, Huizinga and Laeven
(2008) for example show that the corporate tax base of Germany, which was the coun-
try with the highest corporate tax rate in Europe at that time, would have increased
by 14% in the absence of profit shifting incentives.
It is still largely unknown though which companies acutally engage in profit shifting
behavior. Existing studies commonly assume shifting activities to be homogeneous
across firms. An exception is a small literature which argues that intra-firm transfer
prices for firm-specific R&D, innovation and patent rights are hardly observable to tax
authorities and tax-related transfer price distortions are hence especially prevalent in
R&D intensive firms (see e.g. Grubert, 2003; Overesch and Schreiber, forthcoming). The
innovation of our paper is to provide evidence that the degree to which firms engage
in profit shifting behaviour moreover depends on the location of the multinational
headquarters firm. Precisely, we will show that multinationals are reluctant to shift
profits away from their headquarters location, even if the headquarters reside in a
high-tax country. Thus, profit shifting activities between parents and subsidiaries tend
to be large if the parent firm observes a lower corporate tax rate than its subsidiary
and profit is hence shifted towards the parent. If the parent is in the contrary located in
a high-tax country, income shifting away from the parent firm is considerably smaller.
The argument follows recent empirical evidence showing that MNEs bias the location
of profits and profitable assets in favor of the headquarters location (see Dischinger and
Riedel, 2009). This may reflect the central management’s incentive to keep corporate
profits under its direct control at the headquarters firm, for example to avoid agency
costs which arise if profitable assets and functions are managed by a geographically
separated subsidiary abroad (see e.g. Chang and Taylor, 1999; Hamilton and Kashlak,
1999; O’Donnell, 2000). Moreover, the profitability bias may help to justify large wage
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payments for the headquarters’ management and workers (see Budd et al., 2005)1 and
to avoid taxes upon the repatriation of profits from the subsidiaries to the parent firm
(see Dischinger and Riedel (2009) for a detailed discussion).
In this paper, we assess how the profitability bias in favor of headquarters firms affects
corporate profit shifting strategies. Our empirical analysis exploits the firm data base
AMADEUS which contains detailed accounting information on European multinational
subsidiaries and parent firms for the years 1995 to 2007. Controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity across corporate subsidiaries, we test for multinational profit shifting
behaviour by determining the sensitivity of the subsidiaries’ pre-tax profitability to
changes in their corporate tax rate difference to the parent firm (see e.g. Huizinga
and Laeven (2008) for a similar approach). The effect is statistically significant and
indicates economically relevant profit shifting behaviour within multinational groups.
Following our argumentation above, we moreover assess whether the profit shifting
intensity between subsidiaries and their parent depends on the location of the head-
quarters firm in a high-tax or low-tax country. To do so, we split our subsidiary sample
in subsamples of firms with a higher and lower corporate tax rate than the parent.
The results indicate that profit shifting activities are by more than 50% smaller if
the multinational headquarters observe a larger corporate tax rate than the subsidiary
compared to the reverse scenario. This indicates that MNEs are eager to shift profits
out of high-tax subsidiaries towards low-tax parents but are in the contrary reluctant
to shift profits in the opposite direction, from high-tax parents to low-tax affiliates. We
run a set of sensitivity checks to assess the robustness of our results which turn out to
strengthen the findings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the data set used for
the analysis and Section 3 describes the estimation strategy. In Section 4, the estimation
results are presented and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
Our empirical analysis relies on the commercial database AMADEUS which is compiled
by Bureau van Dijk and contains detailed information on firm structure and accounting
of national and multinational corporations in Europe. Our sample comprises firms in
1Among others, Budd et al. (2005) show that workers’ wages depend on their affiliate’s profitability.
Consequently, relocating profits between affiliates may affect the wage rate bargained at the firms of
a multinational group.
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the major countries of EU 27 plus Norway and Switzerland. The time period covered is
1995 to 2007. One major advantage of AMADEUS is that it allows to link accounting
information on parent firms and their corporate subsidiaries which makes the data set
ideal for our purpose.
- Table 1A about here -
For an observation to be included in the sample, it has to belong to a multinational
entreprise. The parent firms in our sample are global ultimate owners of a multinational
group with at least one wholly-owned subsidiary in a foreign country. Note in this
context that the data also comprises parent firms with foreign subsidiaries located
outside our European sample countries as AMADEUS provides ownership links to
foreign subsidiaries and parents on a worldwide basis although accounting information
is available for European firms only. Moreover, to avoid our results to be driven by
holding companies, we exclude small parent firms (with less than 25 employees) from
the data whose total assets simultaneously comprise an overproportional fraction of
financial assets (more than 75%). The subsidiaries in our sample likewise belong to a
multinational group in the sense that they are wholly owned by a parent corporation in
a foreign country. The subsidiaries may own (further) subsidiaries themselves whereas
this is not decisive for our qualitative results. Again, the sample comprises subsidiaries
with parent firms outside Europe. The country statistics for the parent and subsidiary
sample are presented in Table 1A.2
Note moreover that the AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on
the ownership structure is available for the last reported date only which is the year
2007 for most firms in our sample. Thus, in the context of our panel study, there is
some scope for misclassifications of parent-subsidiary-connections since the ownership
structure may have changed over the sample period. However, in line with previous
studies, we are not too concerned about this issue since the described misclassifications
introduce noise into our regressions that is expected to bias our results towards zero
(see Budd et al., 2005).
2The coverage of firms varies between the countries as Bureau van Dijk draws on different in-
formation sources in different countries which vary in their coverage. Nevertheless, profit shifting is
expected to be most pronounced for large multinational firms which tend to be captured in all our
sample countries.
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Finally, following previous studies (see e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008), we moreover
restrict the sample to firms which earn a positive pre-tax profit as taxation is expected
to play a significant role in firms with positive profits only.
The observational unit in our regressions is the multinational affiliate, i.e. the parent
or subsidiary, per year. The sample statistics are presented in Table 1B and are listed
separately for the parent and subsidiary firms in our sample. In total, the data com-
prises 83, 800 subsidiary observations for 20, 704 subsidiary firms and 51, 142 parent
observations for 12, 694 parent corporations. Thus, the subsidiary and parent informa-
tion is on average available for 4.05 years and 4.03 respectively. The average subsidiary
observes a pre-tax profit of 4.1 million US dollars, and a fixed asset stock and annual
payroll sum of 25.7 million US dollars and 6.1 million US dollars respectively. Unsur-
prisingly, the average parent firm in our sample is considerably larger than the average
subsidiary, exhibiting pre-tax profits of 68.7 million US dollars and a fixed asset stock
and annual payroll sum of 577.8 and 94.7 million US dollars.
- Table 1B about here -
As will be described in detail in the following section, the paper assesses the
profit shifting activities between parent firms and their corporate subsidiaries (see e.g.
Dischinger (2008) and Weichenrieder (2009) for a similar approach). The profit shifting
incentive is thereby determined by the difference in the statutory corporate tax rate of
parents and subsidiaries. For the subsample of subsidiaries, the incentive is captured by
the differential between their own statutory tax rate and the statutory tax rate of the
parent firm. For the average subsidiary in our sample, this difference is -2.8%, varying
strongly between -49% and +53.2%. As our analysis will discriminate between high-tax
and low-tax subsidiaries relative to their parent firm, we moreover assess the spread
of the tax rate difference in the two sub-groups which turns out to be comparable in
terms of both, the absolute subsample averages and the standard deviation.
For the subsample of parent firms, the profit shifting incentive is captured by the
unweighted average statutory tax rate difference between the parent and its major-
ity owned subsidiary firms worldwide. Analogously to the previous paragraph, the
subsidiary list for our European parent firms in the sample comprises subsidiaries in-
side and outside Europe. Information on the latter affiliates usually includes the host
country and the parent’s ownership share. As size information is thus commonly not
available, we determine an unweighted average of the tax rate differential between the
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parent and its majority owned subsidiaries. In robustness checks, we also experimented
with size-weighted averages for the subset of firms for which size information is available
and find comparable results.
Furthermore, our analysis will control for other host country characteristics and thus
we merge data on GDP, GDP per capita and a corruption index to the firm accounting
data.3 As suggested by Table 1A, parent firms mainly tend to reside in the large
and highly developed Western European countries while subsidiary firms are spread
across Europe, including Eastern European emerging markets. Hence, unsurprisingly
the average subsidiary is located in a smaller market than the average parent firm
(subsidiary host countries exhibit a GDP of 0.9 trillion US dollars vs. 1.1 trillion US
dollars in parent host countries), in countries with a lower average GDP per capita
(23,425 US dollars vs. 29,529 US dollars) and higher levels of corruption (an average
Tranparency International corruption index of 6.6 vs. 7.5 in the average parent country,
with smaller numbers indicating higher corruption levels).
3 Estimation Strategy
As described above, the aim of our analysis is to empirically determine profit shifting
activities between multinational parent firms and their foreign subsidiaries and to assess
whether the profit shifting intensity depends on the location of the parent firm in a
high-tax or low-tax country relative to its subsidiaries.
We will follow previous studies and quantify profit shifting behaviour between parents
and their subsidiaries by regressing affiliate profitability on the tax rate differential
between the entities. Our argumentation above suggests that this sensitivity is larger if
the parent firm resides in a country with a lower corporate tax rate than its subsidiary
as this implies that profit is shifted towards and not away from the parent firm.
To implement this hypothesis empirically, we in a first step exploit the subsidiary
sample and estimate a regression model which is captured by the following equation
logPBTit = β0 + β1TAXDIFFit + β2(TAXDIFFit ×HTSit) + β3Xit + ρt + φi + it (1)
whereas PBTit depicts the pre-tax profit of subsidiary i at time t. As the distribution
3The information on statutory tax rates is taken from the European Commission. Country data
for GDP and GDP per capita are obtained from the IMF World Economic Outlook Database October
2008. The Corruption Perceptions Index is taken from Transparency International and ranks from 0
(extreme level of corruption) to 10 (free of corruption).
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of the pre-tax profit variable is strongly skewed, we use a logarithmic transformation.
The variable of central interest in the analysis is TAXDIFFit which stands for the
corporate tax rate differential between the considered subsidiary i and its parent firm
in year t. This variable is additionally interacted with a dummy HTSit that takes on
the value 1 if the subsidiary is located in a host country with a larger corporate tax rate
than its parent’s host economy and 0 otherwise. The above discussion suggests that
the corporate tax rate differential exerts a negative effect on the subsidiary’s pre-tax
profitability and hence, β1 < 0. This effects is moreover hypothesized to be larger if
the subsidiary resides in a country with a higher corporate tax rate than the parent
firm and hence, we expect β2 < 0.
Xit depicts a vector of control variables which comprise the corporate input factors
(fixed asset investment and wage costs) as well as a set of time-varying country con-
trols, precisely GDP (to account for market size), GDP per capita (to account for the
country’s income and development level) and a corruption index (to account for the
quality of governance institutions). Additionally, we include a full set of time fixed
effects to account for common shocks to all subsidiaries over time and a full set of
one-digit NACE industry-year fixed effects to pick up industry shocks. Moreover, a full
set of affiliate fixed effects φi is included to absorb time constant heterogeneity between
the entities which is also suggested by a Hausman-Test. it depicts the error term.
As a robustness test, we moreover assess our hypothesis at the other end of the
profit shifting relation and reestimate equation (??) using the sub-sample of parent
firms in our data. To identify high-tax and low-tax parents, we moreover define two
parent samples: The first comprises parent firms which tend to be located in a high-tax
country compared to their subsidiaries, precisely at least two thirds of the subsidiaries
have to observe a lower host-country tax than the parent. Analogously, the second
sample comprises parent firms which tend to be located in a country with a lower
corporate tax rate than their subsidiaries, precisely at least two thirds of its subsidiaries
have to observe a higher corporate tax rate. Note that this analysis is thus by its very
nature less precise than the analysis in the subsidiary sample. Moreover, as the cut-
off value of two-thirds is adhoc, we experimented with other cut-off thresholds which
derives comparable results to the ones reported in this paper.
As described in the previous section, we moreover capture the profit shifting incentive
between the parent firm and its subsidiaries by calculating an unweighted average
corporate tax rate differential between the parent and the affiliates. Analogously, to
equation (??), the tax rate difference is interacted with a dummy variable that takes
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on the value 1 if the parent firm is located in a low-tax country (as defined in the
previous paragraph) and the value 0 if the parent is locted in a high-tax country (as
defined in the previous paragraph). Again, we expect the coefficient estimates for both
variables to be negative.
4 Empirical Results
The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 whereas Table 2 depicts the regressions for
the subsidiary sample and Table 3 depicts the regressions for the parent sample. All
specifications include a full set of affiliate fixed effects and a full set of year fixed effects.
Heterscedasticity robust standard errors which account for clustering at the affiliate
level are reported in brackets below the coefficient estimates.
In Column (1) of Table 2, we employ the subsidiary sample and regress the sub-
sidiaries’ pre-tax profit on the tax rate differential and its interaction with a dummy
that indicates subsidiaries with a higher corporate tax rate than the parent. Simultane-
ously, we account for the size of the input factors (the fixed asset stock and the payroll
sum) and time-varying country controls. The coefficient estimate for the tax rate dif-
ferential is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the multinational firms
in our sample engage in profit shifting activities between their parent firms and sub-
sidiaries. Moreover, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term equally exhibits
a negative sign, thus suggesting that shifting activities are pronouncedly larger if the
subsidiary is located in a country with a higher corporate tax rate and hence, profit
is shifted from the subsidiary towards the parent firm. This result is confirmed if we
additionally control for a full set of industry-year effects in Column (2). Quantitatively,
Column (2) indicates that profit-shifting activities between parent firms and their sub-
sidiaries are by more than 50% smaller if the parent observes a higher corporate tax
rate than the subsidiary compared to the reverse scenario.
- Table 2 about here -
In a second step, we moreover run separate estimations for the two sub-samples of
high-tax and low-tax subsidiaries. Columns (3) and (4) depict the regression results for
the low-tax subsidiary sample. The tax rate differential is found to exert a significantly
negative effect on the subsidiaries’ pre-tax profitability indicating that MNEs engage in
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profit shifting activities between high-tax parents and low-tax subsidiaries. The semi-
elasticity is determined with −0.5. Columns (5) and (6) present the regressions for the
subsample of high-tax subsidiaries and equally indicate a significantly negative semi-
elasticity. The point estimate is −1.7 and is thus pronouncedly larger in absolute terms
than the coefficient estimate for the low-tax subsidiary sample. Moreover, the coefficient
estimates statistically differ at the 10% significance level. Thus, in quantitative terms,
the estimations suggest that the sensitivity of the subsidiary’s pre-tax profitability to
changes in the tax rate difference is by 77% smaller if the subsidiary observes a lower
corporate tax rate than the parent.
As a robustness test, we additionally analyze the other endpoint of the profit shifting
linkage between parents and subsidiaries and focus on the sub-sample of parent firms.
As described in the previous section, we expect that parent firms located in low-tax
countries tend to react more sensitively to tax rate differences than parent firms located
in high-tax countries. Specifications (1) and (2) present regressions of the parent firm’s
pre-tax profitability on the average tax rate difference to the subsidiary firms and its
interaction term with a dummy indicating parent firms in low-tax countries.4 Both
coefficient estimates are negative whereas, however, only the coefficient estimate for
the interaction term gains statistical significance. This indicates that it is mainly par-
ent firms in low-tax economies whose profitability reacts sensitively to changes in the
corporate tax rate differential, thus supporting the hypothesis that especially low-tax
parents engage in significant profit shifting activities.5
- Table 3 about here -
This result is supported by the specifications presented in Columns (3) to (6) which
estimate the regressions separately for parents in high- and low-tax countries. Again,
we find that significant effects prevail only in the latter subsample, suggesting that
4Following, our description in Section ??, the parent dummy variable takes on the value 1 (0) if
the parent firm tends to be located in a country with a smaller (higher) corporate tax rate than two
thirds of its majority-owned subsidiaries.
5In general, the analysis using the parent sample is less precise than the analysis in the subsidiary
sample though as it requires to determine low and high-tax parent firm with respect to all their
subsidiaries. Since parent firms may simultaneously observe subsidiaries in countries with a higher
and lower tax rate, this requires additional assumptions. As described in the previous section, we
consider a subset of ‘extreme’ parents with more than two thirds of the subsidiaries being located in
high and low-tax countries respectively.
8
MNEs are indeed reluctant to shift profits away from parent corporations, even if they
are located in a high-tax country.
In a second robustness check, we moreover assess whether our results are driven by
heterogeneity of multinational groups in other dimensions. To do so, we first account
for the possibility that profit shifting behaviour may be determined by the relative
size of the shifting entities. If profit is, for example, shifted from a large high-tax
entity to a small low-tax entity, the shifting volume may be restricted by the low-tax
affiliate’s ability to absorb and conceal the shifting volume. This might imply that the
optimal shifting volume is large from the viewpoint of the small low-tax affiliate and
hence strongly impacts on its pre-tax profitability while it is low from the viewpoint of
the large high-tax affiliate and hence only weakly impacts on its pre-tax profitability.
To account for that, we define a measure of the relative size of the shifting entities,
precisely the logarithm of the ratio of the subsidiary’s total assets over the parent’s
total asset. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we reestimate the Specifications (1) and
(2) of Table 2 additionally including the relative size ratio and the interaction of the
relative size ratio with the tax difference measure. While the coefficient estimate for
the latter term turns out to be statistically insignificant, our baseline results prevail
suggesting that profit shifting activities between parents and subsidiaries mainly run
from high-tax subsidiaries to low-tax parents.6
- Table 4 about here -
Moreover, profit shifting volumes between parents and subsidiaries may clearly de-
pend on the number of subsidiaries and hence on the number of potential shifting
partners within the multinational group. To account for that, we moreover reestimate
Specifications (1) and (2) of Table 2 additionally including an interaction term of the
logarithm of the number group subsidiaries and the corporate tax rate differential. As
information on the number of subsidiaries is available in a cross-sectional dimension
only, the information is absorbed by the subsidiary fixed effect. The results are depicted
in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 and confirm our previous findings in the sense that
6Note that the robustness check comes at the costs of a reduced sample size as information on the
size of the parent firm is not available for all subsidiaries in our sample (as some subsidiaries e.g. observe
non-European parent firms for which accounting information is not contained in the AMADEUS data
or European parents for which unconsolidated accounting information is unavailable).
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significant and economically large shifting activities are determined between high-tax
subsidiaries and low-tax parent firms only.7
5 Conclusions
With the continuously rising economic importance of multinational firms, policy makers
and researchers have increasingly worried about multinational tax planning strategies
which involve paper profit shifting from high-tax to low-tax economies by distorting
intra-firm transfer prices, the debt-equity structure or the location of value-driving
assets. The topic receives especially high attention since a rising number of papers has
presented empirical evidence that profit shifting activities are quantitatively large and
deteriorate the corporate tax base of high-tax economies around the world. Thus, in
recent year an increasing number of countries have introduced or tightened anti-shifting
legislations, for example strengthened thin-capitalization rules or introduced transfer
price documentation requirements (see e.g. Buettner, et al. 2006).
Our paper contributes to the profit shifting literature by showing that profit shifting
behaviour is not homogeneous across MNEs but that multinational corporations are
reluctant to relocate profits away from their headquarters firms even if these reside
in a high-tax country. Thus, shifting volumes between parents and subsidiaries tend
to be large if parent firms exhibit a lower corporate tax rate than their corporate
subsidiaries and hence, profit is shifted towards the parent firm, while they in the
contrary tend to be small in the opposite scenario when profits are shifted away from
high-tax parents. Quantitatively, the estimations suggest that shifting (as measured
by the profit sensitivity to changes in the tax rate differential) is by more than 50%
reduced in the latter case.
This implies that hosting multinational headquarters firms tends to hedge high-tax
countries against large paper profit outflows through multinational shifting activities.
Thus, complementary to the introduction and tightening of other anti-shifting measures
like transfer pricing or thin-capitalization rules, countries may consider to fight profit
shifting activities by fostering the location of headquarters firms within their borders.
Recent government interventions which aimed at attracting and retaining headquarters
firms suggest that this is already taking place. Thus, recent years have for example seen
several attempts of governments to influence international mergers and acquisitions in
7Again due to missing parent information, the robustness check comes at the costs of a reduced
sample size, see also the previous footnote.
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order to avoid national firms to be taken over by foreign companies and to create
successful national champions.
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7 Appendix
Table 1A: Country Statistics
Variable Subsidiaries Parents
Austria 193 156
Belgium 1,008 782
Bulgaria 550 8
Czech Republic 465 76
Denmark 874 849
Estonia 365 30
Finland 558 285
France 1,729 1,630
Germany 1,292 1,417
Great Britain 3,416 1,325
Hungary 80 20
Ireland 31 76
Italy 1,014 1,518
Luxembourg 110 65
Latvia 14 0
Netherlands 750 1,250
Norway 407 331
Poland 1,018 62
Portugal 257 120
Romania 4,174 13
Slovakia 85 7
Spain 1,536 1,433
Sweden 777 1,073
Switzerland 1 168
Sum 20,704 12,694
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Table 1B: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidiary Sample
Pre-tax Profits∗ 83,800 4,062.4 50,049.3 1 8,055,052
Fixed Assets∗ 83,800 25,653.2 429,889.9 1 4.61e+07
Cost of Employees∗ 83,800 6,077.7 43,943.4 1 6,326,555
Tax Rate Difference to Par∗∗ 83,800 -.028 .099 -.490 .532
Tax Rate Difference to Par∗∗, High-tax Subs 31,701 .069 .065 .0001 .532
Tax Rate Difference to Par∗∗, Low-tax Subs 52,099 -.087 .063 -.490 -.0001
GDPN 83,800 895.9 854.0 5.6 3,320.9
GDP per Capita∗ 83,800 23,424.6 13,958.5 1,566.9 103,125
Corruption Index 83,800 6.5 2.2 2.6 10.0
Parent Sample
Pre-tax Profits∗ 51,142 68,711.1 581,872.2 1 4.47e+07
Fixed Assets∗ 51,142 577,818 4,054,623 2 2.41e+08
Cost of Employees∗ 51,142 94,717.0 556,298.8 1 2.26e+07
Avg. Tax Rate Difference to Subs∗∗∗ 51,142 .014 .087 -.395 .432
GDPN 51,142 1,100.1 812.1 5.6 3,320.9
GDP per Capita∗ 51,142 29,529.7 10,302.4 1,566.9 89,923.2
Corruption IndexF 51,142 7.5 1.5 2.6 10
Notes:
∗: in thousands of US dollars; ∗∗: difference in the statutory corporate tax rates of the considered subsidiary and its
parent firm; ∗∗: unweighted average tax rate difference between the considered parent firm and all majority-owned sub-
sidiaries (inside and outside our European sample countries); N: in billion of US dollars; F: Transparency International’s
corruption perception index ranging from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (no corruption).
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Table 2: Profit Shifting and Headquarters Location – Subsidiary Sample
OLS Affiliate–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2007
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation)
Sub–sample All Subsidiaries Low–Tax–Subs High–Tax–Subs
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tax Difference to Parent -.530∗∗∗ -.507∗∗∗ -.549∗∗ -.507∗∗∗ -1.701∗∗∗ -1.696∗∗∗
(.178) (.181) (.194) (.198) (.366) (.367)
(TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) -.629∗ -.641∗
(.384) (.384)
High-Tax-Subs Dummy .050∗∗ .052∗∗∗
(.021) (.021)
Log Fixed Assets .094∗∗∗ .093 .094∗∗∗ .093∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗ .097∗∗∗
(.007) (.008) (.009) (.010) (.013) (.013)
Log Cost of Employees .384∗∗∗ .385∗∗∗ .377∗∗∗ .381∗∗∗ .388∗∗∗ .383∗∗∗
(.013) (.013) (.015) (.016) (.025) (.026)
Log GDP -.032 -.051 -.031 -.042 -.072 -.074∗
(.038) (.047) (.050) (.062) (.045) (.043)
Log GDP per Capita -.011 .052 -.046 .019 .426∗∗ .519∗∗∗
(.072) (.077) (.088) (.095) (.202) (.202)
Corruption .032∗∗ .031∗∗ -.228∗ -.258∗∗ .465∗∗∗ .454∗∗∗
(.015) (.015) (.122) (.123) (.137) (.137)
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √
# Observations 83,800 83,108 52,099 51,548 31,701 31,560
# Affiliates 20,704 20,449 14,805 14,592 9,039 8,981
Within R2 0.1605 0.1639 0.1583 0.1634 0.1521 0.1578
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are profit-making multinational
subsidiaries per year. All specifications include a full set of affiliate dummies and a full set of year dummies. Sub-sample
High(Low)–Tax–Subs consists solely of subsidiaries that exhibit a higher (lower) statutory corporate tax rate than
their parent firm. Tax Difference to Parent equals the subsidiary tax rate minus the parent tax rate. High-Tax-Subs
Dummy is set to 1 if an observational unit exhibit a higher tax rate than the parent and set to 0 otherwise.
(TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) is the interaction term between Tax Difference to Parent and High-Tax-Subs Dummy. 130
industry-year dummies (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level) are included where indicated.
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Table 3: Profit Shifting and Headquarters Location – Parent Sample
OLS Affiliate–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2007
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation)
Par–sample All Parents High–Tax–Par Low–Tax–Par
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Avg. Tax Difference to Subs -.246 -.254 -.001 .020 -.716∗∗ -.629∗∗
(.245) (.246) (.284) (.286) (.317) (.319)
(TaxDiff)×(Low-Tax-Par) -.834∗∗ -.768∗∗
(.385) (.386)
Low-Tax-Par Dummy .012 .011
(.023) (.023)
Log Fixed Assets .328∗∗∗ .319∗∗∗ .330∗∗∗ .322∗∗∗ .332∗∗∗ .324∗∗∗
(.020) (.020) (.031) (.031) (.029) (.029)
Log Cost of Employees .255∗∗∗ .255∗∗∗ .258∗∗∗ .255∗∗∗ .257∗∗∗ .258∗∗∗
(.018) (.018) (.026) (.026) (.027) (.027)
Log GDP -.044 -.055 .053 .030 -.042 -.034
(.040) (.044) (.045) (.114) (.044) (.048)
Log GDP per Capita .182 .245 -.073 -.004 .106 .174
(.167) (.170) (.276) (.305) (.233) (.238)
Corruption .050 .086 .089 .095 .121 .120
(.112) (.115) (.146) (.150) (.199) (.206)
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √
# Observations 51,142 50,920 26,792 26,688 24,352 24,234
# Subsidiary Firms 12,694 12,610 7,773 7,734 7,007 6,953
Within R2 0.1454 0.1511 0.1437 0.1538 0.1343 0.1428
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are profit-making multinational parents
per year. All specifications include a full set of affiliate fixed effects and a full set of year fixed effects. Subsamples
High(Low)–Tax–Par consists solely of parent firms that exhibit a higher (lower) statutory corporate tax rate than at
least two thirds of their subsidiaries. Avg. Tax Difference to Subsidiaries equals the unweighted average difference
between the considered parent firm’s statutory corporate tax rate and the statutory corporate tax of all majority
owned subsidiaries. The variable Low-Tax-Par is a dummy set to 1 if the parent exhibits a lower corporate tax rate
than at least two thirds of its subsidiaries and takes on the value 0 if at least two thirds of the subsidiaries exhibit a
larger corporate tax rate than the parent. (TaxDiff)×(Low-Tax-Par) is the interaction term between Tax Difference to
Subsidiaries and the Low-Tax-Par Dummy. 130 industry-year dummies (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level) are included where
indicated.
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Table 4: Robustness Checks – Subsidiary Sample
OLS Firm–Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2007
Dependent Variable: Log (Profit before Taxation)
Par–sample Relative Size Subsidiary Number
Explanatory Variables: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax Difference to Parent -.332 -.327 .545 .525
(.356) (.351) (.690) (.698)
(TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) -.774∗ -.726∗ -1.305∗ -1.227∗
(.448) (.447) (.732) (.727)
High-Tax-Subs Dummy .039∗ .040∗ -.001 .003
(.023) (.023) (.034) (.034)
(TaxDiff)×(Log Rel. Size) -.064 -.075
(.104) (.100)
Log Relative Size .692∗∗∗ .695∗∗∗
(.025) (.024)
(TaxDiff)×(Log Number Subs) -.139 -.153
(.179) (.182)
Log Fixed Assets -.033∗∗∗ -.033∗∗∗ .102∗∗∗ .104∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.015) (.015)
Log Cost of Employees .260∗∗∗ .261∗∗∗ .399∗∗∗ .404∗∗∗
(.017) (.017) (.026) (.026)
Log GDP -.021 -.030 -.010 -.011
(.046) (.051) (.055) (.061)
Log GDP per Capita .401∗∗∗ .417∗∗∗ .629∗∗∗ .614∗∗∗
(.109) (.111) (.158) (.160)
Corruption .038∗∗ .038∗∗ .044∗ .048∗
(.017) (.016) (.025) (.026)
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √
# Observations 55,664 55,353 24,534 24,404
# Subsidiary Firms 12,380 12,277 6,237 6,191
Within R2 0.2132 0.2165 0.1629 0.1687
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. Observational units are profit-making multinational
subsidiaries per year. All specifications include a full set of affiliate fixed effects and a full set of year fixed effects.
Sub-sample High(Low)–Tax–Subs consists solely of subsidiaries that exhibit a higher (lower) statutory corporate
tax rate than their parent firm. Tax Difference to Parent equals the subsidiary tax rate minus the parent tax rate.
High-Tax-Subs Dummy is set to 1 if an observational unit exhibit a higher tax rate than the parent and set to 0
otherwise. (TaxDiff)×(High-Tax-Subs) is the interaction term between Tax Difference to Parent and High-Tax-Subs
Dummy. 130 industry-year dummies (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level) are included where indicated. Log Relative Size is the
logarithm of subsidiary total assets over parent total assets. (TaxDiff)×(Log Rel. Size) is the interaction term between
Tax Difference to Parent and Log Relative Size. Log. Number Subs is the logarithm of the parent firm’s overall number
of subsidiaries. (TaxDiff)×(Log. Number Subs) is the interaction term between Tax Difference to Parent and Log
Number Subs.
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